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Abstract—The blockchain technology has achieved tremen-
dous success in open (permissionless) decentralized consensus
by employing proof-of-work (PoW) or its variants, whereby
unauthorized nodes cannot gain disproportionate impact on
consensus beyond their computational power. However, PoW-
based systems incur a high delay and low throughput, making
them ineffective in dealing with real-time applications. On the
other hand, byzantine fault-tolerant (BFT) consensus algo-
rithms with better delay and throughput performance have
been employed in closed (permissioned) settings to avoid Sybil
attacks. In this paper, we present Sybil-proof wirelEss Network
coordinAte based byzanTine consEnsus (SENATE), which is
based on the conventional BFT consensus framework yet works
in open systems of wireless devices where faulty nodes may
launch Sybil attacks. As in a Senate in the legislature where the
quota of senators per state (district) is a constant irrespective
with the population of the state, “senators” in SENATE are
selected from participating distributed nodes based on their
wireless network coordinates (WNC) with a fixed number of
nodes per district in the WNC space. Elected senators then
participate in the subsequent consensus reaching process and
broadcast the result. Thereby, SENATE is proof against Sybil
attacks since pseudonyms of a faulty node are likely to be
adjacent in the WNC space and hence fail to be elected.
Index Terms—Byzantine fault-tolerant consensus, Sybil attack,
wireless network, permissionless blockchain, distance geometry
1. Introduction
Recent years have witnessed an explosive development
in digital cryptocurrency, both in academic fields and fi-
nancial markets. Behind its tremendous success, the key en-
abling technology of digital cryptocurrency is the blockchain
[1], [2] which combines several judiciously designed tech-
niques to facilitate trusted distributed ledgers such that inter-
mediary can be eliminated during transactions. In particular,
the Bitcoin blockchain ingeniously adopts the proof-of-work
(PoW) for mining to, among other purposes, deal with iden-
tity attacks (Sybil attacks) in open (permissionless) systems
wherein the identities of participating nodes are not assumed
to be known a priori. Specifically, each node, whether it
is authentic or a pseudonym, must solve a cryptographic
puzzle to participate in the block generation process and
obtain rewards (mining). Therefore, the impact of a mining
Figure 1. Time-critical application scenarios, e.g., autonomous driving
systems wherein vehicles and pedestrians go through intersections based
on distributed consensus (left); Internet-of-Things where terminals (drones,
sensors and actuators) act based on coordinated and synchronized behavior
(right).
node is directly tied to its computational power, irrespective
of the number of identities it has.
According to the necessity of a prior identity authoriza-
tion procedure, blockchain technologies can be categorized
by permissionless and permissioned blockchains. Permis-
sionless blockchains, such as Bitcoin [1] and Ethereum [3],
are applied in open systems wherein faulty nodes may apply
Sybil attacks, the counteraction of which usually involves
enforcing a strict coupling between the consensus impact
of a node and the computational power (PoW for Bitcoin)
or the resources (proof-of-stake for Ethereum Casper) of the
node. Despite the robustness against Sybil attacks, a price is
payed that permissionless blockchains usually suffers from
high processing delay (6 blocks are recommended in Bitcoin
which amounts to one hour) and low throughput (at most
7 transactions per second [4] for Bitcoin). Many existing
works try to remedy this issue [4], [5], however, the inherent
mining based probabilistic consensus reaching technique is
the key limiting factor. On the other hand, permissioned
blockchains, such as Hyperledger Fabric [6], need not be
wary of Sybil attacks since all participating nodes have gone
through an explicit authentication process such that they
can be trusted. Adopting a long line of existing research
on byzantine fault-tolerant (BFT) protocols [7]–[9], the pro-
cessing delay and throughput of permissioned blockchains
can be dramatically improved; a nice comparison between
traditional BFT protocols and permissionless blockchains is
presented by Vukolic´ [10].
In this paper, a large-scale dense wireless network sce-
nario is considered, which is likely to be encountered in
the future in Internet-of-Things deployments as well as in
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TABLE 1. COMPARISONS WITH BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGIES
Permissionless
blockchain
Permissioned
blockchain SENATE
Open system Yes No Yes
Delay Large Small Small
the context of vehicle networks and intelligent transportation
(Figure 1). We come up with a solution for Sybil-proof BFT
consensus which offers the benefits of both permissioned
and permissionless blockchains (cf. Table 1 for details),
i.e., low-delay and high-throughput BFT consensus in per-
missionless systems. The proposed protocol, namely Sybil-
proof wireless network coordinate (WNC) based byzantine
consensus (SENATE), consists of three major phases: sor-
tition, senator selection and byzantine agreement. SENATE
thwarts the Sybil attack by exploiting the fact that even a
faulty node cannot forge its wireless channel to other nodes
such that a unique wireless fingerprint can be leveraged to
identify nodes; a fully decentralized approach is proposed
to achieve this.
Notations: Throughout the paper, we use boldface up-
percase letters, boldface lowercase letters and lowercase
letters to designate matrices, column vectors and scalars,
respectively. The transpose of a matrix is denoted by (·)T.
Xi,j and xi denotes the (i, j)-th entry and i-th element of
matrix X and vector x, respectively. The `p and nuclear
norm of a matrix are denoted by ‖·‖p and ‖·‖∗, respectively.
The vector consisting of the diagonal entries of a square
matrix is denoted by diag[·]. The trace of a matrix is denoted
by tr[·]. The matrix with all entries being one is denoted by
1, and likewise zero matrix is denoted by 0.
1.1. Related Work
The idea of only allowing selected nodes to participate
in BFT consensus reaching is shared by, e.g., NEO [11]
and Algorand [4]. NEO is a delegated BFT consensus based
blockchain in which a small number of servers are statically
configured to run consensus on behalf of a larger open
network. Similar with SENATE, Algorand counteracts Sybil
attacks by adopting a sortition phase; the difference is that
a random verifiable function based solution combining with
proof-of-stake (PoS) is leveraged by Algorand, whereas
SENATE is based on the underlying wireless channels.
Because SENATE is not employing PoS, it is not tied to
a digital currency and thus can be applied more broadly to
achieving consensus in wireless systems; moreover, it avoids
the unfairness introduced by PoS which intentionally favors
participants with more resources.
Proof-of-location (PoL) in wireless networks is adopted
by Dasu et al. [12] to replace PoW for faster transactions.
The PoLs are generated by authorities such as wireless
network operators and hence some notion of centralization is
introduced. SENATE also uses the concept of PoL whereas,
on a high level, nodes generate PoLs in a fully-decentralized
manner without any trusted authority.
There have been some work where wireless channel
fingerprints are utilized to protect against Sybil attacks (cf.
[13] for a survey and [14], [15] for a signalprint-based
approach). However, most existing work relies on a trusted
authority to verify the wireless channels of nodes [14], or
pre-distribute encrypted keys [13]. In [15], a wireless ad
hoc network of commodity 802.11 devices is considered; a
view selection policy based on signalprint observations is
proposed. Our work considers a fully decentralized wireless
network and a novel WNC based protocol (SENATE) is
proposed; compared with existing work, SENATE has much
lower running time and better understandability and hence
more favourable for real-world implementations.
2. System Model
We consider a wireless network consisting of N geo-
graphically distributed nodes with full connectivity, namely
any pair of nodes in the network are within each other’s
radio communication range. The system is open, or permis-
sionless, in the sense that any node can join the system
without prior identity authentication. The objective is for
the good nodes to reach a valid (the definition for validity
is addressed later) consensus on a set of values over a
certain time period such that deterministic concerted actions
can be carried out, in the meantime, subject to malicious
behaviors by faulty nodes. Note that the considered scenario
distinguishes from the state machine replication wherein a
log is proposed by a client and different nodes agree on the
same log record; here different nodes may have different
set of initial values, e.g., sensory data from environment,
and hence a reasonably good (valid) consensus needs to be
reached.
Unlike existing work on byzantine consensus which
mainly adopts the Internet as the overlay network, a wireless
overlay is considered. In this regard, the behavior of a
faulty node should be clarified. Specifically, the following
assumptions are made in this paper.
• The objective of a faulty node is to rig the consensus
reaching process to benefit itself, rather than halting
the process.
• To achieve its purpose, possible malicious behaviors
include: (1) Byzantine node [7], namely it does not
comply with the protocol and can report arbitrary
messages; (2) Sybil attack [16]: it can generate
pseudonyms to gain inappropriate power in the pro-
cess of reaching consensus.
• In the overlay wireless network, a faulty node does
not block or interfere with other nodes’ transmis-
sions and messages.
The first assumption describes the motive of a faulty
node and therefore has implications on the other two as-
sumptions. The second assumption simply states that, on
a message level, there is no restriction on the behavior of
a faulty node, both from the perspectives of the message
content and the identity of the message sender. In most
existing byzantine agreement protocols with the Internet as
overlay [7], the third assumption is also implied which limits
the malicious behavior of a node to itself; whereas in wire-
less networks with the broadcast nature of electromagnetic
waves, this assumption has more implications, meaning that
a faulty node is assumed to comply with the communication
protocol. For instance, a faulty node would not transmit
when another node is scheduled (by the consensus protocol).
This assumption stems in large part from the first assump-
tion, since messing with the communication protocol, e.g.,
transmitting with a high power and thus blocking other
nodes, leads to retransmissions and hence halting the con-
sensus reaching process. Besides, the following two reasons
also justify the assumption: (1) an attack becomes trivially
devastating without this assumption, namely a faulty node
with sufficient transmit power can block other transmissions
all the time to prevent reaching consensus; (2) a node not
complying with the communication protocol is obviously
malicious and easy to spot.
In this work, we assume nodes can obtain ranging esti-
mations based on others’ pilot signals. However, we do not
focus on specific methods to obtain the distance estimations;
they can be based on receive signal strength (RSS), time of
arrival (ToA) or other approaches which have been studied
extensively [17]. The net effect of ranging estimations is
considered by a statistical model, i.e., dˆij = σijdij + nij ,
where dij denotes the geographic distance between node-i
and node-j and hence dji = dij , the distance estimation at
node-j from node-i is denoted by dˆij , the estimation error
is introduced by multiplicative and additive random coeffi-
cients σij and nij , respectively. In the wireless localization
literature, it is usually assumed that
• For ToA-based ranging estimations, σij = 0 and nij
is modeled as a Gaussian distributed variable.
• For RSS-based ranging estimations, the shadow fad-
ing is modeled as σij which is assumed to be
Gaussian distributed; it is often termed as log-normal
shadow fading by taking logarithm on both sides.
Considering the ranging estimation error, it is observed
thereby that the RSS-based approach is effective with short
distances since there is a multiplicative error component;
the ToA-based approach applies to a more wide range of
distances although it may require a central node to calibrate
the clocks of terminals to ensure synchronization.
3. Overview
SENATE consists of three major phases: sortition, sen-
ator selection and byzantine agreement.
3.1. Sortition
In the sortition process, the objective is to prevent faulty
nodes to generate arbitrarily many pseudonyms; note that
this does not mean we eliminate the Sybil attack by sortition
completely. The key to achieve this is by developing an
ALOHA game with selfish users [18] such that no one can
cheat based on the Nash equilibrium arguments.
In the ALOHA game, a critical requirement is that every
good player (node) knows the total number of users (includ-
ing faulty nodes) in the system to determine its action; in
the considered scenario, this requirement poses a challenge
in the presence of faulty nodes, namely faulty nodes can let
good nodes believe there are fewer nodes in the system such
that good nodes may behave more conservatively and hence
benefit faulty nodes. To prevent this, a chorus procedure
is proposed which leverages the unique pattern of channel
power delay profile (PDP) to estimate the total number of
participating nodes. The key observation is that a faulty node
cannot forge multi-path components (MPCs) and hence this
feature can be utilized, especially with line-of-sight (LoS)
transmission environment, to estimate the node quantity.
Chorus: In this procedure consisting of T time slots,
each node is supposed to randomly select one time slot
to receive and, on the other hand, transmit pilot symbols
in the remaining T − 1 time slots. An analysis in Section
4 shows that even in the presence of faulty nodes, this
procedure is robust. In the receive time slot of, e.g., node-
i, it estimates the PDP of receive signal and calculates the
number of MPCs. In an LoS environment, this measurement
gives an accurate estimation of the number of transmitters
in the system; moreover, even a faulty node cannot generate
multiple MPCs given its location.
This is analogous to let all nodes perform chorus first
such that every node can have an estimation of the popu-
lation based on nodes’ unique timbre. The procedure lasts
T time slots since we assume that nodes cannot operate
in the full-duplex mode; otherwise the procedure can be
shortened to one time slot wherein every node transmit and
receive simultaneously. The detailed procedure, as well as
the analysis for appropriate T , is given in Section 4.
ALOHA game based sortition: Given each node’s
estimations about the total number of nodes in the system,
we let every node be selfish in the ALOHA game to prevent
faulty nodes from gaining advantages; this all-be-selfish
methodology is essentially identical with the blockchain
technology which allows all miners to compete for the
opportunity to register a block. In particular, an ALOHA
random access game with selfish users is implemented. It is
roughly described as follows.
• Every node is selfish, in the sense that they all want
to transmit as soon as possible in a collision-free
time slot. However, after a successful transmission,
a good node would stop competing whereas a faulty
node might keep on transmitting to launch Sybil
attacks.
• Once a node successfully transmits in a time slot
(collision-free), it is selected as the s-th candidate
where s ∈ {1, ..., S} denotes the s-th successful
transmission in the ALOHA game; then it transmits
a pilot signal for ranging estimations immediately
afterwards.
By this definition, it can be shown (Section 4) that a
Nash equilibrium exists based on which every node adopts
the same mixed-strategy [18]: transmit in each time slot with
a probability p with 0 < p < 1, and no one can benefit by
changing the strategy unilaterally.
After a quorum of S candidates is reached, the sortition
phase terminates with S candidates going into the senator
selection in the next phase. Note that a Sybil attack is still
possible; a faulty node may occupy several seats among the
candidates.
3.2. Senator Selection
This phase is dedicated to further removing the
pseudonyms generated by faulty nodes, by cross-checking
the ranging estimations among nodes in a fully distributed
manner.
After S candidates are selected, they no longer follow
the ALOHA-based random access protocol. Instead, each
candidate is assigned a unique time slot to transmit in a
frame of S time slots in this phase.
Since every candidate has transmitted a pilot signal,
every candidate has obtained the distance estimations from
other candidates. For candidate-i, its distance estimations
are denoted by a vector
dˆi =
[
dˆ1i, ..., dˆ(i−1)i, 0, dˆ(i+1)i, ..., dˆSi
]T
, i = 1, ..., S.
(1)
The estimated Euclidean distance matrix (EDM) [19] with
squared norm is hence
Dˆ ,
[
dˆ
2
1, ..., dˆ
2
S
]
. (2)
Distance feedback and symmetry verification: Each
candidate feeds back its dˆi in its dedicated time slot. Af-
terwards, every candidate obtains the distance estimations
between any pair of candidates (double-directional) in the
network. Note that dij = dij , ∀i, j, and thereby every node
can remove suspicious distance feedback based on checking
the estimated EDM (here we assume the feedback is perfect)∣∣∣dˆ2ij − dˆ2ji∣∣∣ <  (3)
where  is a constant related to σij and nij . In this case,
as long as (3) does not hold, both dˆij and dˆij are removed
since we cannot tell if node-i or node-j is lying.
Robust WNC generation: Despite the fact that the sym-
metry verification can, to some extent depending on distance
estimation error, eliminate untruthful distance feedback, a
faulty node can still launch what we refer to as a “shout
attack”1.
Definition 1 (Shout Attack). A shout attack is that a faulty
node pretends to be further away to other nodes, by syn-
chronously adding to the distance estimations to other
nodes. In particular, for ToA-based ranging estimations,
a faulty node can purposely transmit pilot signals later
than supposed, and, accordingly, feed back tampered
1. Likewise, a “whisper attack” can be defined by which the faulty node
pretends to be nearer to other nodes. For ease of exposition, we use the
shout attack for illustration henceforth.
(larger) distance estimations; for RSS-based ranging
estimations, a faulty node can purposely amplify its
pilot signal power and, accordingly, feed back tampered
(larger) distance estimations. 
By definition, a shout attack cannot be detected by
symmetry verification and gives a faulty node arbitrarily
many fake geographical locations that are arbitrarily far
from its real one. The purpose of a shout attack is hence
to create pseudonyms and facilitate the Sybil attack, which
causes a severe challenge to SENATE since SENATE uses
the location information for Sybil protection.
To thwart the shout attack, we introduce the seesaw test
based on the following intuition. In the real world with (at
most) 3-dimensional space, it is increasingly unlikely that a
faulty node, which launches the shout attack, is further away
to other nodes proportionally, as the number of nodes grows.
This is analogous to placing elastic sticks between each pair
of nodes in the system, with the lengths of sticks given
by the distance estimations. The circumstance for a faulty
node launching shout attack in the 2-dimensional space is
illustrated in Figure 2; its related sticks are bent dramatically
and hence the elastic force levers it out (screened out by the
seesaw test), like being on the lighter side of seesaws. This
argument is mathematically formalized in Theorem 2 which
states the local error is proportional to the number of good
nodes.
Node 1
Node 
2
Node 
3
Node 4
Good Node
Faulty Node
Figure 2. A seesaw test. A faulty node launching the shout attack would
be “levered out”.
An iterative WNC calculation with seesaw tests is pro-
posed, the essence of which can be illustrated as follows. In
each round of the iteration, every node, e.g., node-i, uses the
distance estimation to another node-j to push (resp. pull)
node-j if the distance estimation is larger (resp. smaller)
than the predicted distance between the two nodes by the
current WNC; then node-j moves accordingly. At the end
of each round, the node with the largest local error, i.e., its
related seesaws are bent the most, is identified as a faulty
node and therefore removed; note that a termination criterion
(specified later) is added such that the WNC calculation
terminates when the system has small prediction error.
K-means clustering. After obtaining the coordinates of
all candidates, a K-means clustering algorithm [20] is ap-
plied to the coordinates such that all candidates are divided
into K clusters. Then K representatives, each from one
cluster, are selected as senators; this prevents Sybil attacks
because pseudonyms of one faulty candidate are likely to
fall into the same cluster.
3.3. Byzantine Agreement
The K senators run a byzantine agreement protocol to
reach consensus. We primarily consider the median validity
for consensus, which is defined as follows [21].2 Assume a
single consensus value is to be reached upon. Denote by G
the sorted array of the initial values of good nodes. Among
n nodes, f nodes are faulty and it is assumed that f ≤ t
and hence G = [G[0], ..., G[n− f − 1]].
Definition 2 (Median Validity). We call a value x median-
valid, if it holds that
G
[⌈
n− f
2
⌉
− 1− t
]
≤ x ≤ G
[⌈
n− f
2
⌉
− 1 + t
]
.
(4)
Thereby, we adopt the Jack algorithm [21] which ensures
the following properties, as long as the number of faulty
senators, i.e., f , satisfies K ≥ 3f + 1.
• Agreement: For every selection of input values and
every selection of faulty senators, all good senators
can decide on the same value.
• Termination: Every good senator can decide on a
value in finite time.
• Median Validity: The decision is median-valid.
Upon agreement, every senator broadcasts its consensus
value, and every good node in the system adopts the majority
value. Since consensus is reached in the senate, the majority
value can reflect the consensus value and ensures safety and
agreement among all nodes.
4. Sortition
The sortition phase is described in Algorithm 1. We
elaborate on several details as follows.
4.1. Analysis on Chorus Duration
When a node, e.g., node-i, receives signals, assuming its
estimation on the number of transmitting nodes is correct,
the probability of a good node transmitting in this time slot
is
pj = 1− 1
T
, node-j is a good node and j 6= i. (5)
Therefore, the unbiased estimate should be
Nˆi = 1 +
T
T − 1qi, (6)
where qi denotes the estimation of transmitting node in
node-i’s receive time slot. The optimal attack a faulty node
can launch is to let good nodes believe there are more nodes
in the system such that the transmission strategy of the latter
would be more conservative. Therefore, the worst effect
2. Nevertheless, basically any BFT protocol can be plugged in to SEN-
ATE in this phase, and works well in an open system since we have
achieved Sybil-proof in the previous phases.
Algorithm 1: Sortition
Input: Node-1, ..., N ;
Output: Candidate-1, ..., S;
1 Chorus Procedure
2 Every node (node-i) uniform-randomly selects
1 ≤ ti ≤ T .
3 for t=1:T do
4 if t = ti then
5 Node-i transmits a pilot symbol in the t-th
time slot.
6 else
7 Node-i receives signals and estimates the
number of transmitting nodes based on the
receive PDP; the estimation is denoted by
σi.
8 The total number of nodes estimated by
node-i is Nˆi = 1 + TT−1σi.
9 ALOHA Game based Sortition
10 Every node can transmit in every time slot.
11 for s=1:S do
12 The s-th candidate is selected when a new
successful transmission happens and the
corresponding node is candidate-s; afterwards, it
transmits a pilot signal.
13 return Candidate-1, ..., S.
all faulty nodes can conjure is by always transmitting, and
thereby,
Nˆi ≤ 1 + T
T − 1F +
T
T − 1
N−F−1∑
n=1
mn, (7)
where mn is a Bernoulli random variable with parameter
1− 1T . By letting T be sufficiently large compared with N ,
then
Nˆi ≤ 1 + T
T − 1F + (N − F − 1) + O
(
N
T
)
= N +
F
T − 1 + O
(
N
T
)
, F ≤ N (8)
where O (·) denotes infinitesimal. In an LTE system with
time slot of 0.5 ms and 100 nodes, a chorus procedure
lasting 1 s yields NT = 0.05.
4.2. Nash Equilibrium of ALOHA Game
An ALOHA game is described as follows. Every node
participates in the game.
• In a time slot a node successfully transmits
(collision-free), the node receives a payoff of 1− c
where c ∈ [0, 1] denotes the one-time transmission
cost and leaves the game.3
3. A faulty node may otherwise stay in the game and keep playing.
• In a time slot if a collision happens, every transmit-
ting node receives a payoff of −c.
A detailed payoff function is described in Table A. Every
node’s goal is to maximize its payoff in a single time slot
and the game is repeated. Based on the game setting, we
can prove the existence of Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 1. There exists a Nash equilibrium that every node
adopts the same mixed-strategy: transmit with probabil-
ity p(c,N) in each time slot, where
p(c,N) = 1−N−1√c. (9)
Proof: The proof is based on [18]. See Appendix A
for details.
Remark 1. Theorem 1 indicates that by allowing every node
to be selfish, a symmetric equilibria exists, namely even
a faulty node cannot improve its payoff by changing
its transmission probability unilaterally. Specifically, if
it increases its transmission probability, there would be
more collisions and the payoff decreases due to cost c;
if it decreases its chance then its success chance also
decreases. The transmission cost per time slot c clearly
plays a critical role here, which denotes the relative
cost per transmission as compared with one successful
transmission. In practice, we propose that, aside from the
power and resource cost due to wireless transmissions,
an economic approach can be applied whereby a small
fee is charged for every sortition transmission to enhance
the robustness of the process.
5. Senator Selection
In this phase, the S candidates transmit in a round-robin
fashion. The detailed algorithm description of the phase is
presented in Algorithm 2, and some explanations follow.
5.1. Robust WNC Generation
The rationale for robust WNC generation is as follows.
In the face of EDM estimation error introduced by faulty
nodes, i.e., denote
Dˆ = D +E, (10)
where the entries of E can be arbitrarily large considering
malicious behavior, our goal is to recover D. Towards this
end, two structures can be exploited: (a) although the faulty
nodes can cause arbitrarily large error, the error is sparse
in terms of entries of E, i.e., majority is still good; (b) the
EDM stems from space of limited dimensionality4 and hence
there are mature tools in distance geometry [19] that can be
utilized to verify its authenticity. Thereby, considering 2-
dimensional space, the EDM can be written as
D = −2XXT + 1diag
(
XXT
)T
+ diag
(
XXT
)
1T,
(11)
4. We use 2-dimensional space for ease of exposition in this paper.
However, the generalization to 3-dimensional is considered straightforward.
Algorithm 2: Senator Selection
Input: Candidate-1, ..., S;
Output: Senator-1,...,K; validSenate.
1 Distance estimation and feedback
2 for i=1:S do
3 Based on the pilot signals received in the sortition
phase, candidate-i estimtes its distance to other
candidates and feeds back its distance vector dˆi.
4 EDM symmetry verification
5 Σ , |Dˆ − DˆT|.
6 for Every element Dij in Dˆ do
7 if Σij > ∆d then
8 Dˆij ← invalidValue.
9 Robust WNC generation
10 At every terminal, generate the WNC simultaneously
based on the same following procedure:
11 terminate← false; X , [x1, ...,xS ]T ← 0S×2;
e← 0S .
12 while terminate = false do
13 for {i, j} ∈ {1, ..., S} × {1, ..., S} do
14 if Dij 6= invalidValue or 0 then
15 w ← eiei+ej ;
ei ← |‖xi−xj‖2−dˆij |dˆij δw + (1− δw)ei;
f ← w
( |‖xi−xj‖2−dˆij |
dˆij
)
(xi − xj);
16 xi ← xi + γf .
17 maxError← maxi{ei};
errIndex← arg maxi{ei}.
18 if maxError > β
∑
ei
S then
19 Remove candidate-errIndex, and its
corresponding entries in X , e and Dˆ;
S ← S − 1.
20 else
21 terminate← true
22 K-means clustering
23 if S < K then
24 validSenate← false.
25 else
26 S ← Kmeans(X,K); validSenate← true
27 return S; validSenate.
where X ∈ RS×2 is the geographical location coordinates
of candidates, i.e.,X , [x1, ...,xS ]T. We then formulate the
WNC generation problem as follows, exploiting the sparse
error property.
P1: minimize
X,E
‖E‖0, subj. (10), (11) and rank(X) = 2.
(12)
The `0 norm based formulation in P1 is notoriously non-
convex and in fact NP-complete based on compressive
sensing theory. Therefore, the `0 norm in P1 is relaxed to `1
norm which often exhibits near optimal performance [22],
i.e.,
P2: minimize
X,E
‖E‖1, subj. (10), (11) and rank(X) = 2.
(13)
We adopt a data-driven gradient-descend-based method to
solve P2. Based on an estimation dˆij , we can update xi (or
xj) based on the gradient of the objective function in P2:
xi ← xi + µ
∂
∣∣∣‖xi − xj‖22 − dˆ2ij∣∣∣
∂xi
, (14)
which corresponds to the 15-step in Algorithm 2. Also
note that in the algorithm, we keep track of the local error
array e whose element ei represents the squared distance
error related to candidate-i; that is how much candidate-i
is levered in the seesaw test (Figure 2). Therefore in the
15-step, we take into account the fact that a candidate with
small error should not be updated based on the location of a
candidate with large error; the latter is likely to be a faulty
node. Based on this argument, we remove the candidate with
the largest error at the end of each round, until the error is
evenly distributed among candidates which means the error
is introduced by ranging estimation instead of faulty nodes.
In the case that the selected senators do not reach a
quorum of K, Algorithm 2 returns validSenate = false.
Intriguingly, this method is similar with the spring net-
work based method where any pair of nodes are connected
by a spring in, e.g., [17], [23]; the objective in those works
is to minimize the elastic potential energy of the system
(equivalent with the total square error (TSE) of distance
prediction) given the current lengths of springs (distance es-
timations) by placing the nodes (the distances among nodes
are the rest lengths of the springs) on a plane. Although the
objective in P2 is not minimizing the TSE, the presented
data-driven gradient-descend-based method turns out to be
similar with the Vivaldi algorithm [23], except for the faulty
detection.
5.2. Analysis on Seesaw Test
The seesaw test is based on the rationale that a faulty
node implementing the shout attack can be detected because
its resultant location would be out of the 2D space. A ques-
tion arises accordingly: how out-of-space the faulty node is
given a certain strength of its shout attack, and moreover
the effect of the number of good nodes. This question is
important because its answer can quantitatively characterize
the effectiveness of the seesaw test against forged locations.
In seeking for a concise and illustrative answer, we
consider a simplified scenario where there is one faulty
node, without loss of generality located at x0 = (0, 0), who
is trying to launch a shout attack to M good nodes located
at xm = (xm, ym), ∀m ∈ 1, ...,M . Concretely, we consider
that the faulty node adds an arbitrary (independent with real
node-locations) error vector to the entries in the EDM that
are related to it; note that this is more general than the
shout attack whereby the error is added synchronously. The
arbitrary error is written based on (10) as
E =
[
0 eT
e 0M×M
]
. (15)
Note that no ranging estimation error is considered in this
subsection to focus on the synthetic error by the faulty node.
The level of out-of-space of the faulty node is measured by
h(ς2) , EX
[
min
Z, rank(Z)=2
[
min
e, ‖e‖1=Mς2
∥∥∥Xˆ −Z∥∥∥2
2
]]
,
(16)
where Xˆ denotes the reconstructed coordinates of nodes
given the tempered EDM in (10) and (15). In other words,
the level is quantified by the minimum squared Euclidean
distance from the reconstructed coordinate space to its
projection into any 2D space, given that the faulty node
implements the attack that minimizes this distance. It is
essential to note the sequence of minimization, meaning
that the faulty node first chooses the error then the closest
2D space is selected. Since this quantity is affected by the
locations of good nodes by noting that closer good nodes
produce stronger lever force in the seesaw test given the
same strength of shout attack, the expectation in (16) is
taken over a given location distribution. In the following
theorem, we adopt the 2D Gaussian distribution for ease of
exposition.
Theorem 2. Assume that the faulty node is at (0, 0) with
the attack strength of ‖e‖1 = Mς2, and the good nodes’
coordinates are i.i.d. generated based on a Gaussian
distribution with zero mean and variance of σ2, i.e.,
(xm, ym) ∼ (0, σ2I), ∀m ∈ 1, ...,M . When the error
e is independent with (xm, ym), ∀m ∈ 1, ...,M , then
h(ς2) = min
{
(M − 1)σ2, (M − 2)ς2} . (17)
Proof: See Appendix B.
Remark 2. It is shown that a faulty node cannot con-
ceal its lie by noting that h(ς2) scales with the attack
strength ς2, until ς2 is comparable with the squared
distance measurement (σ2) whereby the attack becomes
quite obvious. In addition, the effect is amplified by
approximately M times; this is intuitive since it becomes
increasingly more difficult to lie to more good nodes
when they form a concrete 2D space. Another note is
that h(ς2) > 0 as long as M ≥ 3, because at least 3
nodes can determine a 2D space.
Remark 3. The theorem assumes that the error matrix E is
independent with the coordinates of good nodes, which
requires that a faulty node is not aware of the coordinates
of other nodes (assumed mostly good nodes) in the
sortition phase; this is reasonable because the coordinate
information is not accessible in the sortition phase before
any distance feedback occurs.
Corollary 1. In L-dimensional space, h(ς2) =
min
{
(M − L+ 1)σ2, (M − L)ς2}.
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Figure 3. The probability a valid consensus is reached with 100 nodes.
Remark 4. This corollary generates the effectiveness of the
seesaw test to higher dimensions, e.g., 3D scenarios with
applications for, e.g., drone swarms.
6. Byzantine Agreement
In this phase, since we have removed Sybil nodes from
the selected senators to a great extent, basically any byzan-
tine agreement protocol can be implemented among the K
senators. In particular, we adopt the Jack scheme proposed
in [21] which consists of the following two major stages:
• Setup stage: Each senator broadcasts its initial value
and receives other senators’ initial values. Thereby,
each senator broadcasts its acceptable values and
a proposed value, jointly considering its and other
senators’ initial values.
• Search stage: Rotating among (t + 1) pre-
determined leaders, in each round a leader receives
proposals from other senators and accordingly pro-
poses a value based on its acceptable values; if an
agreement is reached based on proposals, the leader
would propose the agreed value. It is proved that
as long as one leader among the (t + 1) leaders is
a good node, a valid agreement would be reached.
Therefore, at most t faulty nodes are allowed in this
phase.
The validity is assured by the median validity specified
in Section 2. The termination and agreement properties
are also proved in [21]. In fact, this protocol achieves the
optimum safety and 2-approximate of the optimum median
validity.
7. Simulations
We run a computer simulation to test the performance
of SENATE. The ranging estimations at nodes are assumed
to be perfect, and the information exchange is simulated by
direct modifications of data arrays for nodes.
In Figure 3, where there are N = 100 nodes and
SENATE selects S = 50 candidates and K = 7 senators,
the number of faulty nodes is shown by x-axis and the
performance of consensus probability is shown which is
obtained by running the algorithms for 1000 episodes. The
node locations are randomly generated in a square with a
side length of 200 meter in each episode. The faulty nodes
are assumed to always launch Sybil attacks and propose
randomly generated values which are deviating from the true
values; specifically, the good and faulty nodes’ initial values
are uniformly randomly generated from interval [−1, 1] and
[99, 101], respectively. In the figure, we also simulate the
Jack algorithm [21] without faulty nodes launching Sybil
attacks for comparisons; the Jack algorithm under this sce-
nario and attack assumptions can ensure consensus when the
number of faulty nodes does not reach majority (50%), and
cannot otherwise; this is direct consequences of the design
of the Jack algorithm and the definition of median validity. It
is observed that SENATE perform close-to the conventional
BFT protocol as if there is no Sybil attack; this verifies
that SENATE is Sybil-proof. We also observe that SENATE
perform better when faulty nodes reach majority, which is
because the SENATE randomly selects the senators such that
there is a probability that the selected senators are dominated
by good nodes; the Jack algorithm can also perform, at least,
as well as SENATE if a sortition phase is added, but the
effect is not shown in the figure to be in line with the original
Jack algorithm.
8. Conclusion
SENATE is a real-time distributed BFT protocol which
is applicable to fully-connected wireless-networked sys-
tems without prior identity authentication. In order to
prevent malicious nodes to generate an arbitrary number
of pseudonyms, SENATE leverages the wireless signals
transmitted by nodes to cross-verify their identities in a
fully-decentralized (no-trust) manner, based on the fact
that pseudonyms are likely to be adjacent geographically.
Thereby, only selected nodes, i.e., senators, participate in
the final consensus reaching process. Computer simulations
show that SENATE is Sybil-proof, by comparing the con-
sensus probabilities between systems wherein faulty nodes
launch and do not launch Sybil attacks, respectively.
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Appendix A.
Proof of Theorem 1
First, we invoke the following lemma which ensures the
existence of a Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 1 ( [24]). A finite symmetric game has a symmetric
mixed-strategy equilibrium.
The finite symmetric game in Lemma 1 denotes a game
wherein every player has the same finite action set, and
the payoff received by each player given the same action
(and other players’ actions) is identical, irrespective with
the specific player. A mixed strategy is in contrast with a
pure strategy; the latter employs a fixed action each time
whereas the former can be viewed as a mix (randomized
strategy) of the latter. The proof of Lemma 1 is based on
the Brouwer fixed point theorem and is omitted for brevity.
Provided the existence of symmetric equilibria, we are
ready to derive the transmission probability p for every node.
Due to symmetry, it suffices to consider a single node, whose
game choice is shown in Table A.
TABLE 2. PAYOFF FUNCTIONS
All other nodes
are silent (p1)
Some other node
transmits (p2)
Expected payoff
Transmit 1− c −c (1− c)p1 − cp2
Silent 0 0 0
The probability of each event is
p1 = Pr{success} = (1− p)N−1;
p2 = Pr{collision} = 1− (1− p)N−1. (18)
Based on the principle of indifference [25], both expected
payoffs should be zero, which yields (9) and concludes the
proof.
Appendix B.
Proof of Theorem 2
Based on (11), the EDM without error can be written as
D = −2XXT + 1diag
(
XXT
)T
+ diag
(
XXT
)
1T
= −2XXT + 1
[
0, βT0
]
+
[
0, βT0
]T
1T, (19)
where β0 ,
[
d210, ..., d
2
M0
]T
, and X =[
0 x1 · · · xM
0 y1 · · · yM
]T
, [0, X¯T]T. The attack is
implemented on EDM and we can derive the resultant
coordinate covariance, which is tampered by the attack,
based on [19]:
XˆXˆ
T
= −1
2
(
D +E − 1[0, βT0 + eT]− [0, βT0 + eT]T1T
)
= XXT +
1
2
([
0 0T
0 1eT
]
+
[
0 0T
0 e1T
])
=
[
0 0T
0 X¯X¯
T
+ 12
(
1eT + e1T
) ] . (20)
First, we notice that the eigenspace of XˆXˆ
T
in (20) is at
most 4-dimensional (the other eigenvalues are zeros) by the
rank inequality
rank(XˆXˆ
T
) ≤ rank(X¯X¯T) + rank(1eT) + rank(e1T)
= 4. (21)
In addition, the eigenspace is spanned by
eigenspace(XˆXˆ
T
) = span{x,y,1, e}, (22)
where x , [x1, ..., xK ]T and y , [y1, ..., yK ]T; this can be
seen from the following equation.
X¯X¯
T
+
1
2
(
1eT + e1T
)
= [x,y,1, e]
[
I 0
0 12I
]
[x,y, e,1]T. (23)
Note that we assume E is independent with X¯ , and that the
power of the error is ς2, i.e.,∥∥∥∥1eT + e1T2
∥∥∥∥
∗
= ς2M. (24)
Since the error is assumed to be independent with the
coordinates and that i.i.d. Gaussian coordinate vectors are
uniformly directed in space, a constant share of the error
power is leaked out of the coordinate eigenspace spanned
by [x,y]. Considering the objective of the faulty node is to
minimize the leakage power beyond any 2D space, which
in this case is equivalent to maximizing the power in the 2D
space given that the total power is fixed, the best attack the
faulty node can implement is to concentrate its error power
to the same linear space spanned by 1, i.e.,
eopt = ς
21. (25)
Note that the solution e = −eopt also satisfies the conditions,
however, it results in a negative eigenvalue of XˆXˆ
T
. This
violates with [26, Theorem 2] which proves an important
property of EDM that if XˆXˆ
T
is not positive-semi-definite,
then there exists at least three distance measurements vio-
lating the triangle inequality. In other words, a shout attack
may put the faulty node in a higher-dimensional space
whereas a whisper attack would lead to violation of the
triangle inequality which is much easier to spot.
Let us consider the minimization inside the expectation
in (16), this is an optimal low-rank approximation prob-
lem whose solution is well known to be the dominant 2-
dimensional singular space of Xˆ , i.e., the eigenspace of
XˆXˆ
T
. Denoting the singular value decomposition (SVD)
of Xˆ as Xˆ = UˆΣˆVˆ
T
(singular values are always arranged
in non-increasing order), then
Zopt = Uˆ2Σˆ2Vˆ
T
2 , (26)
wherein Uˆ2 and Vˆ 2 denote the first two columns of Uˆ and
Uˆ , respectively, and Σˆ2 contains the two dominant singular
values. It follows that the minimum projection error is
min
Z∈RM×M , rank(Z)=2
∥∥∥Xˆ −Z∥∥∥2
2
=
∥∥∥Xˆ −Zopt∥∥∥2
2
=
M∑
i=3
Σ2i,i,
(27)
which is the coordinate power leakage beyond 2D space
due to tampered EDM. To solve for this quantity, we
adopt the Gram–Schmidt orthogonalization process on the
set {x,y, |ς|1} (given the optimal attack derived in (25)).
Based on symmetry that x and y are both i.i.d. Gaussian
distributed, it is clear that the direction of the third vec-
tor is not relevant and hence it is replaced by w where
w ,
√
ς2M [1, ..., 0]T with the same power. For brevity, the
detailed process is omitted as the orthogonal basis vectors
and the expected leakage power h(ς2) are given as below:
u1 = x;
u2 = y − u
T
1y
‖u1‖22
u1;
u3 = w − u
T
1w
‖u1‖22
u1 − u
T
2w
‖u2‖22
u2;
h(ς2) = min
i={1,2,3}
{E[uTi ui]}
= min
i={1,2,3}
{Mσ2, (M − 1)σ2, (M − 2)ς2}, (28)
and the conclusion follows immediately.
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